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*I.P.Q. 1  Abstract 
The Chicago School of the law and economics movement, on which the predominant 
justification for independent property rights is based in most countries, is flawed mainly 
because it takes economic wealth as the sole proxy for well-being. We suggest replacing it 
with a well-being approach, which, even if it is still based on utilitarianism, does not suffer 
from this defect. A theory-neutral approach to well-being for policy-making is achievable 
because there is a substantial area of common ground between rival theories on what we call 
the "markers" of well-being. We identify markers which we believe would be consistent with 
all mainstream theories of well-being and then verify whether the current intellectual 
property framework reflects the markers or not, and propose suggestions for change when it 
does not.  
 
Introduction  
Intellectual property is one of the most important assets a country can have. One need only 
quote a 2012 report from the US Patent and Trademark Office stating that intellectual 
property-intensive industries "support at least 40 million jobs and contribute more than $5 
trillion dollars to, or 34.8 percent of, U.S. gross domestic product (GDP)".1  
 
In a previous article,2 we have shown that utilitarianism is the main justification for 
intellectual property rights in most countries. One of its derivatives, the Chicago School of law 
and economics (L & E), strongly dominates the current intellectual property legal framework, 
but it is both ideological and flawed. In the main, it takes economic wealth as the proxy for 
well-being, but research has shown that economic wealth is an inadequate proxy for general 
well-being. Therefore, it must be replaced.3 Strangely, policy-makers have only noted the 
importance of well-being in other fields of law and not (yet) in relation to intellectual 
property.4 We suggested replacing economic wealth with a well-being approach, which, while 
it is still*I.P.Q. 2  based on utilitarianism, does not suffer from these defects. We argued 
that a theory-neutral approach to well-being for policy-making is achievable because there is 
a substantial area of common ground between rival theories on what we call the "markers" of 
well-being. In this article, we identify markers which we believe would be consistent with all 
mainstream theories of well-being (first section) and then verify whether the current 
intellectual property framework reflects the markers or not, and propose suggestions for 
change if it does not (second section). 
 
In this article, we use the term "intellectual property rights" (IPR) to refer solely to patents 
and copyright. This is because the utilitarian justification is more suited to these two rights 
than to trade marks and related rights (such as geographical indications). By contrast with 
patents and copyright, trade mark rights apply to signs rather than products. They mainly 
serve as an indication of origin so as to avoid consumer confusion. The rationale for 
protecting them is therefore different from that justifying patents and copyright. We 
acknowledge that an investment function close to that of patents and copyright also exists for 
trade marks, but it is not the dominant one and is only really relevant to some trade marks, 
namely well-known ones. To the extent that designs are a hybrid between patent and 
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copyright and that other intellectual property rights related to patents and copyright, such as 
plant variety rights and neighbouring rights copyright, can also be justified by utilitarian 
concerns, the reasoning in this article can apply to them too. However, for reasons of space, 
we have conducted the analysis only in relation to patents and copyright proper, and further 
analysis is necessary to see whether our conclusions would hold for rights related to patents 
and copyright. 
 
The theory-neutral approach to well-being  
An approach to the justification of intellectual property rights based on well-being faces an 
obvious challenge. There are a number of rival theories of what well-being consists in, such 
as hedonism, desire- or preference-satisfaction theories, and objective-list theories. The 
debate between these competing accounts shows no sign of being resolved. Choosing one 
theory of well-being over the others as the basis for the justification of intellectual property 
rights invites challenge from the supporters of the rival theories. 
We have argued elsewhere5 for a theory-neutral approach to well-being in the context of 
public policy. We contend that, contrary to initial appearances, there is likely to be a 
substantial area of common ground between rival theories of well-being. This is because 
something may be relevant to well-being in one of three different ways: it may be 
constitutive of well-being, or it may tend to produce well-being, or it may do neither of these 
things but nevertheless act as an indicator of well-being. Something which stands in any one 
of these relationships to well-being may be considered a "marker" of well-being. Markers of 
well-being, notwithstanding the different relationships in which they stand with respect to 
well-being itself, are all potentially relevant to its measurement. Data concerning a marker of 
well-being will facilitate the making of judgments about well-being itself. 
Different explanatory theories of well-being disagree about what constitutes well-being. 
However, for each theory it will be the case that other things beyond what it regards as 
constitutive of well-being will be either productive or indicative of well-being. These are likely 
to include things that a different theory would regard as constitutive of well-being. When this 
is the case, although the two theories will remain*I.P.Q. 3  in disagreement about whether 
the item in question is a constituent of well-being, they can both agree that it is a marker of 
well-being. 
In order to identify the implications of basing intellectual property rights directly on well-
being rather than on economic considerations, it is necessary to consider which markers of 
well-being are sufficiently widely shared between different theories that they can be treated 
as such for the purposes of our proposed theory-neutral approach. 
Markers of well-being  
We define a marker of well-being, for the purposes of our theory-neutral approach, as 
something which, according to all the mainstream theories (those which are well established 
and widely held), is either constitutive, productive or indicative of well-being. This definition 
provides a criterion against which candidate markers of well-being may be judged. Since 
markers of well-being chosen to fulfil a role in relation to intellectual property law or other 
areas of public policy must secure broad acceptance, they should also fit well with widely held 
folk assumptions about well-being. A third criterion by which the case of a candidate marker 
of well-being may be judged is the extent to which evidence from empirical research suggests 
that it correlates well with other markers. We suggest that the following markers of well-
being would score well against these criteria: 
Marker 1—Happiness 
"Happiness" is sometimes used as a synonym for well-being, but here we use it in a slightly 
different sense—arguably its primary sense in English—to refer to what is sometimes called 
"positive affect": "feeling happy", having a positive emotional state or an overall positive 
balance of pleasure over pain in one’s life. 
For hedonist theories, happiness in this sense, or something like it, is wholly constitutive of 
well-being. And for many other theories it is one among several constituents of well-being. 
Even for those theories—such as certain objective-list theories—which do not regard it as 
constitutive of well-being, it is plausibly an indicator of well-being: people whose lives are 
going well will tend to be happy. It also has a good case to be considered productive of well-
being: there is evidence, for example, that it has a positive effect on health.6 Happiness also 
fits well with common sense folk assumptions—it is likely to be one of the first words that will 
come to people’s lips when they are asked to talk about well-being. 
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Marker 2—Health 
Here we interpret "health" broadly to include all aspects of physical health: not only freedom 
from disease and injury, but also adequate nutrition. It would also include mental health. Like 
happiness, health fits well with common sense folk assumptions about well-being. We tend to 
assume that being in good health makes a difference to our quality of life. 
Health is regarded as a constituent of well-being by many theories: in particular objective-list 
theories. For more subjective theories—hedonism and desire/preference satisfaction 
theories—it is not a constituent of well-being in its own right. However, such theories are 
likely to regard health as productive of well-being. Overall, good health correlates positively 
with happiness—and poor health negatively.7 Good health is an*I.P.Q. 4  enabler of, and 
poor health an impediment to, the achievement of central life goals. Good health is for these 
reasons a likely object of informed/rational desire (and much actual desire). 
We regard health and happiness as perhaps the most secure markers of well-being: those 
which are likely to be most widely accepted. There are others which we also believe have a 
strong case: 
Marker 3—Life-satisfaction 
Life-satisfaction can be seen as a complementary notion to happiness: the two are combined 
in the construct of "subjective well-being". If happiness reflects a person’s affective or 
emotional response to their life, life-satisfaction can be seen as reflecting their cognitive or 
judgmental evaluation of it. It is often the subject of empirical study, using methodologies 
such as the Satisfaction with Life Scale.8 We use the term broadly, to include methodologies 
which, like the Cantril Ladder scale used by the Gallop World Poll, ask subjects to rate their 
life on a scale rather than say how satisfied they are with it. 
Life-satisfaction is constitutive of well-being according to certain theories.9 In other theories, 
it tends not to feature as a constituent of well-being. However, it is a good candidate as an 
indicator of well-being on all of the mainstream theories. A person’s level of satisfaction with 
their life is, in effect, their own assessment of how well that life is going. It can therefore be 
regarded as equivalent to a first-person judgment of well-being. We are not infallible judges 
of our own well-being, and thus, at least for theories which do not regard life-satisfaction 
itself as constitutive of well-being, it is not guaranteed to provide an accurate picture. 
Nevertheless, a person’s own view of their well-being surely counts for something. Certainly, 
it has a strong common sense claim to do so. 
Marker 4—Success in realising central life goals/values 
This marker concerns the extent to which a person succeeds in securing the things they most 
care about, whether these be goals to which they aspire or aspects of their lives that matter 
to them. It is thus a form of desire/preference satisfaction, but one which reflects only those 
desires or preferences to which a person attributes central importance in their life. This 
marker is thus at least partially constitutive of well-being for desire/preference satisfactionist 
theories of well-being. The achievement of a person’s goals is also partially constitutive of 
well-being on some objective-list theories.10 It will tend to be productive (and arguably 
partially constitutive) of well-being for life-satisfaction theories. 
It is plausible that this marker is productive or indicative of well-being for other theories, at 
least to some extent. For example, all else being equal, the achievement of goals and 
realisation of values is likely to be something that tends to increase happiness. It also 
coheres well with common sense intuitions—surely success in our central life goals must 
make a difference to how well our lives go? 
Marker 5—Supportive personal relationships 
We interpret this term broadly, to include marriage, relationships with family members, 
friendships and even relationships with others such as neighbours and work colleagues, 
insofar as these can be regarded as supportive. By "supportive", we mean that the individual 
derives benefit from the relationship (in its own right, rather than indirectly, as in a purely 
business relationship). This might be in various ways: through emotional support in times of 
difficulty, providing companionship and (for some relationships, not others) intimacy.*I.P.Q. 
5   
Close personal relationships are partially constitutive of well-being for many objective-list 
theories.11 For subjective theories, supportive personal relationships have a strong case to be 
regarded as productive of well-being, as a source of happiness and a buffer mitigating the 
effects of causes of unhappiness, and/or the subject of actual and informed desires and 
preferences. There is evidence that supportive relationships of various kinds correlate well 
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with other markers of well-being: for example, being married tends to have a positive effect 
on reported happiness and life-satisfaction, as well as on health.12  
Marker 6—Personal development 
By this we mean the development, improvement and exercise of various mental and physical 
aspects of our natures as human beings. It would include, therefore, the development of 
intellectual skills and the acquiring of knowledge, typically through education. This marker 
would also include the development of abilities associated with personality and emotion, such 
as leadership, courage and aesthetic appreciation; and of physical abilities, for example 
through sport. 
Personal development—defined in various different ways, but broadly on the above lines—is 
constitutive of well-being for a family of theories influenced by Aristotle.13 Elements related to 
personal development, such as knowledge, are also partially constitutive of well-being for 
some objective-list theories.14 Personal development is plausibly productive of well-being for 
other theories. The development of our mental and physical abilities is likely to help us in 
achieving our desires, and in turn to be a source of satisfaction with our lives and of 
happiness. 
Marker 7—Leisure 
By this we mean the opportunity to spend time relaxing and to pursue interests and activities 
beyond those required by work, or by the need to secure the essentials for human existence. 
It is regarded as a constituent of well-being by many objective-list theories.15 As an obvious 
source of pleasure, it has a strong case for being productive of well-being for hedonist 
theories. Many of our desires (though not always our most central ones) are focused upon 
leisure activities, so it seems likely to be productive of well-being for desire/preference 
satisfactionism also. Leisure seems to correlate well with happiness16 —active leisure 
activities more so than passive ones such as watching TV—and with subjective well-being 
more widely.17  
Marker 8—Adequate income/resources 
By "adequate" here, we mean sufficient resources to enable certain other markers of well-
being, such as good health (which implies adequate nutrition) and achievement of personal 
goals, to be secured. Those resources, in most societies, will typically be in the form of 
income or wealth but need not necessarily be so in all circumstances. The focus on 
"adequate" income or resources reflects the fact that there is evidence that income has a 
much greater impact upon most other markers of well-being at low levels than at higher 
ones.*I.P.Q. 6  18  
Adequate income is not constitutive of well-being under any widely accepted theory (though 
income has sometimes been treated as a proxy for well-being by classical economists). 
However, it is an essential enabler for certain other markers of well-being on any mainstream 
theory. 
Marker 9—Rewarding employment 
We use the term "rewarding employment" rather than simply "employment" in recognition of 
the fact that employment is not always rewarding for the employee, and may sometimes—for 
example, in conditions where employees are exploited by employers—have a negative rather 
than positive impact upon well-being. Where both job-satisfaction and life-satisfaction are 
measured, there seems to be a good correlation between the two.19  
Rewarding employment is not constitutive of well-being under any mainstream theory. 
However, it is clearly an enabler of other markers. For most people, employment is their 
primary source of income and may also be productive of other markers of well-being. There 
seems to be a strong relationship between un employment and relatively low levels of 
happiness and life-satisfaction.20  
Further markers  
Our list is relatively conservative—it includes only those items which we believe can be 
regarded as meeting our criteria with a high degree of confidence. There are others, such as 
autonomy, for which a case could be made. We have not attempted to set out all the things 
which stand in one of the three relevant relations to well-being (i.e. are constitutive, 
productive or indicative of well-being): only those which might credibly be targeted by 
governmental intervention in general and/or intellectual property law in particular. It should 
also be noted that there are certain factors which appear to have an influence upon well-
being (from the fact that they show correlations with subjective well-being measures) which 
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are not realistically subject to influence by government policy. These include age, relative 
social position and genetic predispositions.21  
We can now examine whether the markers of well-being we identified are respected in the 
current intellectual property law framework. 
Markers of well-being and intellectual property law—do IPRs enable the markers 
common to all theories of well-being?  
There are two ways in which well-being might be relevant to policy on IPRs. It might be a 
point in favour of IPRs, where encouraging invention or creation in a particular field could be 
expected to increase general well-being in some way. But it could also be a constraint: if a 
creation or invention is likely to decrease well-being, that might be a point against it. 
At this juncture, it is useful to recall the utilitarian rationale for IPR, as interpreted by the law 
and economics movement under the Chicago School (L & E). IPRs are there to incentivise 
production of works and inventions and provide a means for creators and inventors to recoup 
their investment; L & E takes economic wealth as the proxy for utility. But if we take 
utilitarianism in its original philosophical form, it is there to foster overall utility in the sense 
of well-being and not just generating income for the inventors and creators. 
We will look at the markers identified in the previous section and see how current copyright 
and patent laws enable them. This will show whether the IPR framework is aligned with or 
favours human well-being.*I.P.Q. 7  The section examines both the viewpoint of inventors 
and creators and that of users to check whether overall well-being is achieved. 
A point needs to be made before starting the discussion: the markers happiness and life 
satisfaction would be difficult to target directly through IPRs since they depend upon other 
things, including the other markers. We will therefore not address them here. In a wider 
policy context, however, they should be useful when trying to measure well-being and thus in 
testing the impact of government interventions. Thus, after the tailoring of IPRs according to 
the other markers (if we find that the current legal framework needs to be modified), 
happiness and life satisfaction data could be used to see if the new IPR policy framework has 
achieved its goal, i.e. fostering (more) happiness and life satisfaction. Marker 2 (health) 
affects users far more than inventors, so it is considered under the section "From the users’ 
point of view" below. We therefore start with marker 4. 
From the creators and inventors’ point of view  
Marker 4—Success in realising central life goals/values 
IPRs allow people to achieve success by realising their central life goal or value (in this case 
creating and inventing) in the sense that most countries allow anyone to create and invent 
and no one is discriminated against. Thus intellectual property laws adequately take care of 
the well-being of individuals for whom creating or inventing is a central life goal.22  
Thus, as far as purely utilitarian considerations are concerned, IPRs seem likely to promote 
this marker of well-being. However, it should be noted that some deontological concerns may 
arise in this context—in particular about discrimination. National treatment applies virtually 
everywhere as international conventions, and especially the TRIPS Agreement, are pervasive, 
so this problem should not occur often. But, in the few countries which do not have national 
treatment then well-being in this respect will not be achieved. Whether a country has 
adhered or not to TRIPS or other international intellectual property conventions, they would 
be well advised to adopt the national treatment principle or at least not discriminate based on 
nationality. Additionally, there may be direct or indirect discrimination against minorities such 
as on the basis of gender or sexual orientation in some countries. This may be inside the 
intellectual property laws themselves or "unwritten", i.e. only as part of a custom or practice. 
A few examples will suffice to illustrate this point. South Korean nationals can file patent 
applications in North Korea. However, it is known that those applications are rejected. In the 
US, a trade mark right assumes that the President of the US is male. US copyright law has a 
provision only allowing surviving spouses of authors to terminate licences or transfers of 
copyright 35 years after they occur. Because in some US states "spouse" only includes 
opposite-sex spouses, the same-sex partners of gay or lesbian authors cannot exercise this 
termination right. 
A flipside of this is the wish of some authors to only have certain types of people (such as 
black people or men) depicted or play in their works (operas, plays). The question here is to 
balance the well-being of the authors against that of the performers and the spectators. 
When there are specific reasons for the works to be performed in this way then the 
"discrimination" may be justified. By way of example, a French court has respected the wish 
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of Samuel Beckett to have his play Waiting for Godot only played by men. The court held he 
was allowed to refuse changes made by the director to the characteristics of the characters of 
the play, i.e. make women play instead of men.*I.P.Q. 8  23  
Marker 5—Supportive personal relationships 
IPRs may allow people to be employed and form supportive personal relationships in the 
workplace but this is not guaranteed. Some inventors may work for a company that does not 
support them and eventually leave. It seems unlikely that IPR could be specifically tailored to 
achieve supportive personal relationships for inventors/creators, although IPRs may have that 
effect sometimes. 
Marker 6—Personal development 
By personal development, we mean the development of intellectual skills and the acquiring of 
knowledge, the development of abilities associated with personality and emotion, such as 
leadership, courage and aesthetic appreciation; and of physical abilities, for example through 
sport. In modern societies, education is one of the means through which personal 
development is fostered. 
Copyright and patents laws incentivise inventors and creators to make and market 
educational works and inventions including toys that can be used at home or in the 
classroom. They thus allow the personal development of inventors and creators as well as 
that of the users (in relation to the latter, see section "From the users’ point of view" below). 
Marker 7—Leisure 
As far as inventors and creators are concerned, IPRs are not necessary for the enjoyment of 
leisure. People can create works or invent new products without needing to market them in 
order to enjoy this very leisure activity (e.g. painting recreationally or fiddling with computers 
in the garage). This is because there is nothing to incentivise; the creators and inventors do 
not intend to recoup their investment. So maybe copyright and patents should not subsist in 
works created by individuals who do not wish to market them. There is the problem, though, 
that the creators and inventors may at some point want to do just that and the law should 
not take the marketing and enforcing possibility away as one of the other markers of well-
being is adequate resources or income. The default position of IPRs applying to all creations 
and inventions is therefore probably adequate. An alternative would be for the law to provide 
that creations made for pleasure or play rather than for marketing have an automatic licence 
to use attached to them, which would be revocable at any time. However, as many creators 
and inventors would not be aware of this default position and would thus not mark their 
works with this licence, it would be hard for the public to know what is and is not a work 
created purely for recreational purposes. This sort of option is therefore not workable in 
practice, unless copyright registration were to be reinstated.24 For patents, the mere 
disclosure of the invention to the public takes the right away anyway. 
Marker 8—Adequate income/resources 
IPRs enable inventors and creators to recoup their investments. Of course, if consumers do 
not like some inventions or works, they will not buy them. But this is not specific to IPRs. 
This could be the case for any product. 
Some patent laws also have specific provisions to appropriately reward employees when the 
invention has been particularly beneficial to the employer (e.g. ss.40 –42 of the UK Patents 
Act 1977). Some copyright laws such as the German one have a provision which forces 
publishers to pay additional sums to authors*I.P.Q. 9  if the payment contractually agreed is 
"conspicuously disproportionate to the proceeds and benefits derived from the exploitation of 
the work" (art. 11, 32 and 32a of the German Copyright Act; see also in a similar vein 
art.L.131-4 of the French Intellectual Property Code). But some copyright laws such as that 
of the UK do not have such provisions and allow lump sums to be paid to authors which can 
be very low. There is some case law dealing with abuses in this respect which can have an 
effect similar to the provisions of the French and German copyright codes.25 However, 
whether laws should include such "appropriate reward" clauses is more of a fairness issue (a 
deontological consideration) than a utilitarian one. Nevertheless, these provisions certainly 
add to the well-being of authors. 
Marker 9—Rewarding employment 
This marker overlaps a little with markers 4–6 and 8. Thus to some extent the above 
comments made on these markers also hold for this one. But IPRs here do more than simply 
provide income to creators and inventors. They allow them to exercise the profession they 
want to embrace. In this respect, IPRs generally enable well-being.26  
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From the users’ point of view  
Marker 2—Health (including nutrition) 
Clearly, IPRs foster inventions which improve health as they give the incentive to inventors to 
invent pharmaceutical compounds and medical devices to help treat ailments. IPRs do not 
foster innovation in the field of methods of treatment if they are excluded from protection 
(art.27(3)(a) TRIPs allows member countries to exclude "diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical 
methods for the treatment"). But the question is whether innovation in this respect does not 
occur anyway as doctors and surgeons are encouraged to develop such methods simply 
because the nature of their profession is helping patients and not making a profit. A doctor or 
surgeon embraces a liberal profession "where expectations of renown and reward have 
traditionally taken quite different forms from those which flow from exclusive rights over 
commercialisation".27 There is also a moral issue here, namely that it is not ethical to grant 
monopolies to doctors as they allow them to deny treatments to other doctors and their 
patients.28 Nevertheless, in some countries (such as Australia), methods of treatment are 
patentable. 
If we follow an L & E perspective, only drugs, medical devices (and treatments) for which 
people are able to pay will be incentivised so that the overall well-being of the population will 
by definition not be met. Only a fraction will be healthier as a result. 
From a well-being perspective, it may be that IPRs as such are not the best method to create 
overall well-being on balance, i.e. taking into account the well-being of the inventors and the 
users of the inventions. If nobody or very few people can pay for the medicine, treatment or 
device, intellectual property laws will not work as the inventor will not be incentivised to 
invent the relevant invention. In that case, the state should therefore intervene by way of 
prizes or publicly funded research so that overall well-being is by definition generated. Since 
the state-funded drugs, medical devices and treatments would not be protected by IPRs—the 
state pays the cost of invention ex ante (prior to the invention being made or shortly after 
invention and before marketing)—the inventor’s investment is zero and his reward is 
financed*I.P.Q. 10  by the state so that his/her well-being is enhanced.29 Likewise, the 
whole population can have access to the invention at cost (cost of production which is 
generally low like for generics) and the overall well-being of the users that need the invention 
is also taken care of. 
A second possibility is a system where the state finances the cost of medicines, devices and 
drugs ex post (i.e. after they have been invented and patented) by setting a standard low 
cost price so that the entire population can have access to them and by paying the remainder 
of the price charged by the patentee. In this scenario, most inventors will want to invent all 
sorts of medical or pharmaceutical inventions. However, this is not guaranteed as it depends 
on individuals/private companies rather than on the state taking the initiative to fund the 
research and costs leading up to the invention. Under an L & E perspective, therefore, most 
companies will only invest in those drugs which will attract most profits such as, e.g., Viagra 
or drugs for diseases affecting a large number of people (e.g. cancer, Alzheimer’s disease) 
and may neglect other important diseases. 
A third possibility is a mixed system where there is some state-funded and some private R & 
D. So long as they are complementary, i.e. the state funds what private companies would not 
invest in, then the system is adequate from a well-being perspective. This mixed system is 
applied in the EU as both national and EU institutions fund (e.g. award prizes for) research 
for ailments which are not always the priority of private companies.30 Of course, this mixed 
system can also be complemented by charities funding and other initiatives such as the 
Health Impact Fund31 and WIPO Re:Search.32 States which do not have a mixed system may 
thus have to adjust their policies if their goal is to enhance overall well-being. 
Marker 5—Supportive personal relationships 
The question is, what kinds of inventions and creations favour supportive personal 
relationships? Information and communication technologies (ICT) i.e. the internet (including 
internet dating sites, Facebook), email and telephone enable colleagues, friends and family to 
keep in touch when separated. However, do we need more than what we already have, i.e. 
voice/video-over-IP and basic (mobile) phones, or, even, do we need what we already have? 
Maybe we need to use ICT less passively or more sparingly, i.e. not to replace physical 
contact but to complement it. Recent research suggests that heavy or passive use of ICT 
decreases happiness.33 If an L & E perspective is followed, companies will have a tendency to 
update their products in order to increase profits. But updating does not necessarily mean 
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improving. Even if patents are granted only for new and inventive inventions, they do not by 
definition result in an improvement. In a similar vein, copyright only requires originality which 
also does not necessarily mean improvement. 
Meaningful supportive personal relationships generally involve physical contact, so IPRs do 
not seem to have much of a role to play here. One specific type of invention one could think 
of is a better way to communicate with severely disabled people. Probably improvements can 
be made to those which already exist (such as the system used by Stephen Hawking). 
Another area where improvements could be made is transportation systems so as to enable 
quicker and more efficient transportation to enable physical contact between loved ones who 
are separated (including enabling those who cannot drive to do so, e.g.*I.P.Q. 11  via 
driverless cars). So IPRs do enable supportive personal relationships in this respect. As for 
the health marker, it all depends whether the market will provide for the relevant 
technologies. If it does not, then the state has to step in. 
Marker 6—Personal development 
The ability to become educated, to research and criticise are crucial to personal development. 
Copyright laws generally have educational and research exceptions and patent laws often 
allow use for research, experimental and/or private purposes. Many countries also have an 
exception allowing use of a work for the purpose of criticism.34 If an L & E approach is taken, 
exceptions disappear if the market failure disappears too. 
That said, these exceptions are not specifically stated in any intellectual property treaty 
(except to some extent criticism via art.10(1) of the Berne Convention, which provides a 
quotation exception35). In order to ensure that countries are actually obliged to include these 
exceptions in their law and also to prevent free trade agreements (FTAs) from dispensing 
with this exception, it would be good if at least TRIPS, and ideally all intellectual property 
conventions, included these exceptions as they are necessary for overall well-being. The 
exact extent of these exceptions may be left to national laws, but with the proviso that they 
should not be too narrow and that they respect the three-step test. 
In addition, some intellectual property laws allow contracts to overturn all or some exceptions 
or are silent over this possibility, giving rise to uncertainty as to whether it is legal to 
overturn them. If an L & E perspective is followed to the letter, exceptions should be 
"bargainable". However, from a well-being perspective, this is not the case. Overriding 
exceptions relating to criticism, educational use and research annihilate at least partially the 
well-being of the users. Therefore, from a well-being perspective, such exceptions should be 
safeguarded. International conventions should make these exceptions imperative or, at the 
very least, overridable only under very specific justified conditions (while it is difficult to find 
an example where overriding the exception for the purposes of criticism would be beneficial, 
it may be justified that, in some circumstances, only non-commercial research be excluded 
from the scope of the exclusive rights). 
Finally, having an exception in the legal framework does not mean that some remuneration is 
by definition not paid to the right holder. Here a balance has to be made in each case, 
weighing the well-being of the creator/inventor with that of the users. What is clear, though, 
is that only in exceptional cases can the right holder prevent use for criticism, educational or 
research purposes. The exclusive nature of the right is suspended for these particular uses. 
Marker 7—Leisure 
IPRs can benefit leisure, insofar as they incentivise people to create inventions and works 
that provide opportunities for leisure activities. These new works and inventions thus benefit 
users—simply think of new novels and films. Leisure includes not only consumption but active 
participation. As to consumption, if a user wants to watch a film, read a book or play with an 
invention, they can go to a library, watch television or else rent or buy the book, film, toy or 
other IP-protected product. Normally, competition exists in the market and it should be fine 
for most people to enjoy leisure activities. Copyright or patents are not a hindrance.*I.P.Q. 
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However, in terms of active participation, IPRs may pose problems. For instance, if a user 
wants to make a new work out of a work whose copyright is still in force, so-called user 
generated content (UGC), and share it online, this will in most cases infringe copyright. 
Arguably, people do not have to post the work publicly (i.e. unrestricted on YouTube or 
Facebook) and can share it privately (i.e. only among friends and family). Nevertheless, some 
copyright laws do not allow private copying (e.g. the UK, Ireland, New Zealand, Malaysia). In 
order to allow active leisure activities, private copying should arguably be allowed. As these 
activities remain private, there is no harm to the right holder especially if remuneration is 
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paid. The three-step test is therefore respected. The Infosoc Directive includes an exception 
for private copying36 but some Member States have chosen not to implement it. Many non-
European countries have such an exception and it is generally subject to a levy in order to 
compensate right holders. The parody exception exists in some countries and allows users to 
create new works parodying a previous work under certain conditions and make them public. 
But, arguably, it is not necessary to enable the marker of leisure since active leisure activities 
are generally private. Patents laws which have the exception for private use allow the pursuit 
of leisure activities. 
Marker 4—Success in realising central life goals/values 
This marker overlaps with markers 6 and 7. Users can usually use IPR-protected material to 
achieve their central life goals and values—working, playing sports, reading, educating 
oneself, going to the theatre, concert, cinema, etc. The exceptions in the legal framework 
also allow this, subject to the provisos discussed above in markers 6 and 7. 
Marker 8—Adequate income/resources 
It may be that some works and inventions are too expensive for some users. If the price can 
be said to be excessive or the IPR holder refuses access to their work or invention, 
competition law or sometimes even intellectual property laws have mechanisms to curb the 
abuse of the IPR holder (mainly compulsory licences). Generally, such abuse only occurs 
when the IPR holder has a dominant position or a monopoly on the market. This happens but 
is generally rare. Article 8(2) of the TRIPs Agreement has a specific provision to that effect.37 
In this respect, the IPR framework is globally satisfactory. More could be done of course to 
refine the framework—e.g. inserting rules in statutory law detailing when a compulsory 
licence must be imposed to the IPR holder which abuses its monopoly or dominant position, 
rather than leave it to the courts such as is the case in the EU. This applies to users who also 
want to create or invent for professional purposes. Indeed, users are not only consumers of 
works and inventions but can also be follow-on creators and inventors themselves. 
In respect of markers 4 and 8, the term of protection of copyright may be an issue (the 
patent law term is only 20 years and is generally thought to be adequate overall, although it 
may be too long for some inventions and too short for others in some cases). On the other 
hand, the copyright term is extremely long: it is 50 years post mortem auctoris (p.m.a.) in 
most countries of the world because of TRIPS and the Berne Convention which impose this 
duration. In the EU and the US, it is 70 years p.m.a. The question is whether such duration 
does not unnecessarily hinder further creation. Even if the user can sue if the price is 
excessive or the right holder refuses a licence, it is generally costly and very lengthy to do so. 
The well-being of users is thus decreased as they prefer not to sue and thus cannot use the 
work. It is clear that the well-being of the authors who have created the works in question is 
a non-issue after their death and*I.P.Q. 13  there is no more creation to incentivise from 
them. So if anything the term of protection should be the length of the author’s life at most. 
Right holders argue that the royalties collected after an author’s death allow them to invest in 
new creators. It may be so but there is no mechanism in place (except at the level of some 
collecting societies in some countries) to force right holders to invest excess royalties in new 
creators. Furthermore, a long term of protection is likely to favour already famous authors 
(because these are those whose music, books, etc. still sell years after their creation) who 
may have reached such a high income that still further income is likely to make little 
difference to their happiness.38  
Marker 9—Rewarding employment 
This marker is related to/overlaps a little with markers 4–6 and 8. Users who need to use 
protected subject-matter in their profession can generally ask for a licence and if it is refused 
or the price is excessive, competition law is the usual recourse. 
Conclusion  
As stated in this article and our previous paper,39 we propose to reject GDP, economic wealth 
or income as the proxy of utility and replace it by well-being and adjust the IPR framework 
accordingly. Even if GDP or income was accepted as a marker of well-being, it is clearly a 
marker of limited reliability at best, and is certainly not the proxy for well-being that the L & 
E approach assumes it to be. Applying well-being rather than income as the basis for the 
justification of IPR to the intellectual property laws’ provisions is more inclusive, even if in 
some cases only marginally, than the current economic justification for IPRs. It includes 
things, such as health, which the L & E approach does not fully take into account, and it 
makes some exceptions mandatory and imperative. 
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Not surprisingly, from a creator’s and inventor’s perspective, the current intellectual property 
laws (based on the proxy of income) are generally adequate. However, there are still some 
laws which include unjustified discriminations and these diminish the well-being of authors 
and thus should be scrapped. 
Intellectual property laws are also in the main adequate from a user’s perspective. However, 
some adjustments are necessary. A mixed system for pharmaceuticals is necessary. All 
countries should have exceptions for private copying, educational purposes, criticism and 
research. A way to ensure this is to enshrine those exceptions specifically in the international 
treaties and ensure they cannot be overturned by contract both at national and international 
level, e.g. via free trade agreements.40 The term of protection of copyright should be 
reduced, and compulsory licences in the case of abuses and excessive prices along with a 
cost- and time-effective system could be introduced in the intellectual property laws and 
treaties rather than be left to competition law. 
Another question is whether IPRs should not incentivise, or should incentivise less or more, 
certain inventions and creations. Most intellectual property laws already exclude inventions, 
and in some cases also creations, which are contrary to ordre public and morality.41 Under a 
well-being perspective, there are a great number of achievements which should not be 
protected and certainly those contrary to ordre public and morality would fall in this category. 
We leave the question whether more achievements could fall in this category for another 
paper.*I.P.Q. 14   
As to the question whether certain inventions and creations which favour well-being should 
be more or less incentivised than others, it is arguable that certain technologies do not by 
definition enhance well-being, such as some ICT.42 Under a well-being perspective, whether 
an invention (e.g. a software update) is new and inventive or original is not the only relevant 
consideration. If it is not also an improvement, in that it is not likely to enhance well-being, it 
should arguably be less of a priority compared to other inventions and works which are. If it 
is likely to have a negative effect on well-being, perhaps it should not be patentable or 
copyrightable at all. The question will be how to establish the creation or invention’s likely 
positive or negative impact on well-being. Sometimes this may be apparent from its 
predictable effects on markers of well-being such as health. In other cases, evidence from 
unbiased, statistically significant surveys or trials may be useful (in the vein of trials made 
before a pharmaceutical is released for purchase on the market). One may object that 
consumers would abandon an ICT product if it does not enhance well-being and that 
competition eliminates new and inventive products which do not enhance well-being. In 
short, the current framework is adequate. But to some extent it is less true of ICT, because 
of its network and therefore lock-in effects.43 Also this does not take into account the 
generally poor judgment most people have of whether a certain technology will enhance their 
well-being or not. Therefore, the legal framework may have to add a condition for works and 
inventions, namely that they have no negative impact on well-being—patent applications 
would be rejected and copyright works would not be protected if there were good enough 
reasons for believing that the invention/work would have a negative impact on well-being. 
This would mean a dent into the current technology neutrality of intellectual property laws. 
More research needs to be done to uncover whether, and if so which, technologies should be 
subject to this additional hurdle and whether this hurdle should be part of the IPR legal 
framework or left outside it, e.g. to technology regulators or ethicists. In the meantime, 
national intellectual property offices and the relevant directorates general (DG) of the 
European Commission should launch a debate on this very issue.44  
Estelle Derclaye  
Tim Taylor  
I.P.Q. 2015, 1, 1-14 
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